Summit Scorecard

2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Scorecard

William H. Tobey, Matthew Bunn, Eben Harrell, and Martin Malin

The success of the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit will depend on how much progress has been made to fulfill the commitments made by nations at the 2010 Washington Summit, how much overall progress is being made toward effective security for all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material, and how the Seoul Summit strengthens what was agreed in Washington. While some achievements have already been publicized, the Seoul Summit will undoubtedly occasion additional announcements. This document is intended to serve as a brief scorecard to evaluate progress toward effective nuclear security, and hence to judge the success of the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit.

Commitments from the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit

National Commitments

The United States encouraged participants in the Washington Summit to commit to specific national actions to improve nuclear security, in addition to the steps outlined in the summit communiqué; in response, 29 countries made 54 such commitments. They ranged from Chile's agreement to send all of its highly enriched uranium (HEU) — amounting to roughly 18 kilograms — to the United States for secure storage to Belgium's modest contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund.

The Partnership for Global Security and the Arms Control Association found that by February of 2012, roughly 80 percent of the specific commitments made by states at the 2010 Summit had been fulfilled.1

Work Plan

The Washington Summit also issued a politically binding work plan with some 50 separate steps to be undertaken by participating nations. These steps were generally either long-term projects, such as gaining sufficient states parties' ratification of the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to allow for its entry into force, or ongoing processes, such as assistance for implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which, among other things, requires states to provide "appropriate effective" security and accounting for nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials.

While at least some progress has been made toward virtually all of these steps, the very nature of the work dictates that few have been accomplished completely, one exception being the revision of the International Atomic Energy Agency's key document on nuclear security (INFCIRC/225). Thus, the work plan is progressing, but far from complete.

What to look for in evaluating progress at Seoul:

  • Fulfillment of 2010 national commitments
  • Significant new national commitments to improve nuclear security
  • Continued commitment to an effective work plan

Progress in the Four-Year Effort to Secure Nuclear Weapons and Materials2

Improving security for the highest risk stockpiles:

  • Pakistan
    • Progress: Unknown
    • Remaining Risk: High
    • Risk trend: Worsening
  • Russia
    • Progress: Significant
    • Remaining risk: Medium
    • Risk trend: Stable or slowly declining
  • Research Reactors with Enough HEU for a Crude Bomb
    • Progress: Significant
    • Remaining risk: Medium
    • Risk trend: Declining

Achieving a baseline level of nuclear security:

  • Progress: Modest
  • Remaining risk: Medium
  • Risk trend: Slowly declining

Consolidating stockpiles at fewer locations:

  • Progress: Significant, but some categories not addressed.
  • Remaining risk: Medium
  • Risk trend: Declining

Strengthening the global nuclear security regime:

  • Progress: Moderate
  • Remaining risk: Medium
  • Risk trend: Slowly declining

Improving security practices, training, and culture:

  • Progress: Moderate
  • Remaining risk: Medium
  • Risk trend: Declining

What to look for in evaluating progress at Seoul:

  • Recognition by states with weapons and materials at high risk that nuclear security is a significant problem and demands attention by national leaders
  • Commitment to ensuring that all states with nuclear weapons, separated plutonium, and HEU have at least a baseline level of security for these stocks in place
  • Commitment to sustain over the long haul nuclear security where physical and procedural upgrades have been implemented
  • Acceleration of HEU reactor conversions/closures, with the goal of ending civil use of HEU by a date certain
  • Consolidation, and certainly not expansion, of weapons and weapons-usable material storage sites
  • Ratification of nuclear security conventions and amendments, and in the meantime voluntary adherence before entry into force
  • Commitment to understand and implement lessons learned from security lapses that led to seizures of nuclear material beyond state control and to implement remedial measures
  • Support for and implementation of recommendations by the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security and the World Institute for Nuclear Security and participation in peer review audits of nuclear security practices.

March 2012


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Notes:

1 Michelle Cann, Kelsey Davenport and Margaret Balza, The Nuclear Security Summit: Assessment of National Commitments (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association and Partnership for Global Security Report, Updated March 2012)

2 For specifics see Matthew Bunn, Eben Harrell, and Martin B. Malin, "Progress on Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: the Four-Year Effort and Beyond," (Cambridge, Mass.: Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, March 2012).